PENGARUH INSENTIF EKSEKUTIF, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE RISK DAN KONEKSI POLITIK TERHADAP TAX AVOIDANCE

Danur, Alviyah Inayatul Mahmudah (2021) PENGARUH INSENTIF EKSEKUTIF, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE RISK DAN KONEKSI POLITIK TERHADAP TAX AVOIDANCE. Skripsi thesis, Universitas Pancasakti Tegal.

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Abstract

ABSTAK Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji secara empiris pengaruh insentif eksekutif, kepemilikan institusional, komisaris independen, corporate risk dan koneksi politik terhadap tax avoidance. Populasi penelitian ini adalah perusahaan BUMN yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) pada tahun 2015-2019 yaitu sebanyak 20 perusahaan. sampel penelitian berjumlah 100 laporan perusahaan yang dipilih dengan metode purposive sampling. Data yang digunakan adalah data sekunder yang diperoleh di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) dan analisis data menggunakan regresi linier. Hasil dalam penelitian ini membuktikan bahwa insentif eksekutif, kepemilikan institusional, komisaris independen, corporate risk dan koneksi politik tidak memiliki pengaruh positif terhadap tax avoidance. Kata kunci: Insentif Eksekutif, Kepemilikan Institusional, Komisaris Independen, Corporate Risk, Koneksi Politik, Tax Avoidance =============================================================================================== ABSTRACT This study aims to empirically examine the effects of executive incentives, institutional ownership, independent commissioners, corporate risk and political connections on tax avoidance. The population of this research is BUMN companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2015-2019, as many as 20 companies. The research sample of 100 company reports were selected by purposive sampling method. The data used are secondary data obtained on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and data analysis using linear regression. The results in this study prove that executive incentives, institutional ownership, independent commissioners, corporate risk and political connections do not have a positive influence on tax avoidance. Keywords: Executive Incentives, Institutional Ownership, Independent Commissioners, Corporate Risk, Political Connections, Tax Avoidance

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